Abstract. We study the security of symmetric encryption schemes in settings with multiple users and realistic adversaries who can adaptively corrupt encryption keys. To avoid confinement to any particular definitional paradigm, we propose a general framework for multi-key security definitions. By appropriate settings of the parameters of the framework, we obtain multi-key variants of many of the existing single-key security notions. This framework is instrumental in establishing our main results. We show that for all single-key secure encryption schemes satisfying a minimal key uniqueness assumption and almost any instantiation of our general multi-key security notion, any reasonable reduction from the multi-key game to a standard single-key game necessarily incurs a linear loss in the number of keys. We prove this result for all three classical single-key security notions capturing confidentiality, authenticity and the combined authenticated encryption notion.
Introduction
In theory, most symmetric and public key cryptosystems are considered by default in a single-key setting, yet in reality cryptographic ecosystems provide an abundance of keys-and hence targets-for an adversary to attack. Often one can construct a reduction that shows that single-key security implies multi-key security, but typically such a reduction is lossy: an adversary's multi-key advantage is roughly bounded by the single-key advantage times the number of keys n in the ecosystem. The ramifications of such a loss can be debated [17] , but undeniably in a concrete setting with perhaps 2 30 to 2 40 keys in circulation, an actual loss of 30 to 40 bits of security would be considerable. Therefore the natural question arises to what extent this loss in the reduction is inevitable.
This inevitable loss of reductions from multi-key to single-key has previously been addressed by Bellare et al. [6] when introducing multi-key security for public key schemes. Specifically, they provided a counterexample: namely a pathological encryption scheme that has a small chance (about 1 n , where n is a parameter) of leaking the key when used in a single-key environment. In a multi-key scenario, where there are n key pairs, insecurity of the scheme is amplified to the point where it becomes a constant. It follows that any generic reduction, i.e. a reduction that works for any scheme, from the multi-key to single-key security must lose a factor of about n. A similar example can be concocted for symmetric schemes to conclude that there cannot be a tight generic reduction from a multi-key game to a singlekey game for symmetric encryption, i.e. a reduction that works for all encryption schemes, since the reduction will not be tight when instantiated by the pathological scheme. However, this does not rule out all reductions, since a tighter reduction could exist that exploits specific features of a certain class of (non-pathological) schemes.
Consider a setting with a security notion G for primitives (e.g. pseudorandomness for blockciphers), a security notion H for constructions (e.g. ciphertext integrity for authenticated encryption), and suppose we are given a specific construction C[E] building on any instantiation E of the primitive. A reduction An extended abstract of this paper will appear at TCC 2017; this is the full version.
R would take adversary A against the H property of the construction and turn it into one against the G property of the primitive. To be black-box, the reduction R should not depend on A, but instead only use A's input/output behaviour. However, when considering black-box reductions, it turns out there are many shades of black. Baecher et al. [4] presented a taxonomy of black-box reductions; the shades of black emerge when considering whether R may depend on the construction C and/or the primitive E or not. A fully black-box (BBB) reduction works for all C and E, while partially black-box (NBN) reductions can depend on the specific choice of C and E.
The pathological encryption schemes used as counterexamples are by nature rather contrived and the one used by Bellare et al. is of dubious security even in the single-key setting [6] . The counterexamples suffice to rule out tight BBB reductions, but they do not rule out the existence of potentially large classes of encryption schemes-perhaps practical ones, or even all secure ones-for which a tight NBN reduction does exist. Clearly, such an NBN reduction could not be generic, but instead would have to exploit some feature of the specific primitive or construction under consideration. Even when the primitive is assumed 'ideal' as is common in symmetric cryptology, the relevant reductions typically still depend on the details of the construction at hand, and are therefore not fully (BBB) black-box. Concluding, for secure schemes the relation between single-key and multi-key security is still largely unsettled.
Our Contribution. Focusing on authenticated encryption (AE) schemes, we make two main contributions: a general multi-key security definition including corruptions and lower-bounds on the tightness of black-box (NBN) reductions from the multi-key security to the single-key security of AE schemes.
General Security Definition. The first complication we face is the choice of security notions. As we recall in more detail in Sect. 2.1, there are many different ways of defining single-key security for AE. For instance, confidentiality can be expressed in several (not necessarily equivalent) ways, including left-or-right indistinguishability (LRIND) and ciphertexts being indistinguishable from random strings (IND). Moreover there are different ways of treating nonces; each defines a slightly different security notion.
When moving to a multi-key setting, the water becomes even more muddied, especially when considering adaptive corruptions as we do. Adaptive corruptions allow an adversary to learn some of the keys during the course of the multi-key game; it models the real-life circumstance that not all keys will remain secret and some will leak. In this setting, security can be formulated in (at least) two ways: firstly using a hidden bit b i for each key K i , with the adversary having to guess the bit b i for a key K i that has not been corrupted; and secondly, using a single hidden bit b determining the 'challenge' oracles for all n keys (e.g. left or right, real or random) with the adversary having to guess this bit b, under the restriction that no single key gets both corrupted and challenged.
As we explain in Appendix B, these two approaches do not appear to be tightly equivalent to each other. Furthermore, notions that used to be equivalent in the single-key setting suddenly start drifting apart, something previously observed in the multi-instance setting [9] . Again, this creates a bit of a conundrum as to what is the 'right' multi-key security notion, where we want to avoid a situation where we show that a reduction loss targeting one security notion is inevitable, while leaving the door open for tight reductions targeting another.
To avoid having to make a choice, we instead provide a general definition for multi-key security game (Definition 7) that allows us to plug in the 'flavour' of AE security we desire, and of which the two approaches for dealing with corruptions in a multi-key setting are special cases.
Lower Bounds on the Loss for Simple Reductions. Roughly speaking, we show that for any member G n of a large class of n-key security games that allow for adaptive corruptions and for most AE schemes C[E] built on a single-key secure AE scheme E (including C[E] = E), any black-box reduction from G n for C[E] to a standard single-key security game H 1 for E incurs a loss that is close to n. By 'black-box', we mean at least NBN: the reduction must be black-box with respect to the adversary against G n but can depend on C and E. A roadmap of our results, showing that some reductions between the security notions for authenticated encryption are necessarily lossy. A green arrow G → G indicates that there is a non-lossy reduction from G to G (so security in the sense of G implies security in the sense of G ). A red arrow G → G indicates that all reductions from G to G have a loss that is linear in n. Fig. 1 shows both the logic of our approach and the overall results. The main idea is to first consider a very weak n-key security game, K n , and show that reductions from K n to H 1 are lossy. Then, for any n-key game G n that tightly implies K n , the loss from G n to H 1 will have to match that from K n to H 1 (or a contradiction would appear when composing the reduction from K n to G n with that from G n to H 1 ). Our weak security notion K n is a 1-out-of-n key recovery game where the adversary first sees encryptions of fixed messages under all n keys, then corrupts all but one key and must try to guess the uncorrupted key. The choice for the three H 1 notions AE-PAS, IND-PAS, and CTI-CPA is inspired by their ubiquity in current AE literature (the naming convention is clarified in Sect. 2.1).
To show for each choice of H 1 that reductions from K n for C[E] to H 1 for E are lossy, we use three meta-reductions. Unlike using pathological schemes as counterexamples, meta-reductions can easily deal with NBN reductions that depend on the construction C and scheme E: a meta-reduction M simulates an ideal adversary A against C[E] for a reduction R and then uses R to break E [3, 15, 20] . Then one finds the inevitable loss factor of R by bounding the advantage of M (in its interaction with R) by the advantage of the best possible adversary against E. We remark that this technique is vacuous for insecure schemes E as the resulting bound on the advantage of M is not meaningful.
More precisely, we show that for the three choices of H 1 , any black-box reduction running in time at most t from K n for C[E] to H 1 for E must lose
, where is essentially the maximum advantage in H 1 of an adversary running in time n · t. These results hold provided that C[E] is key-unique: given sufficient plaintext-ciphertext pairs the key is always uniquely determined. For almost all variants G n of our general n-key security game, there is a tight reduction from K n to G n (Lemma 12); combining this tight reduction with the unavoidable loss from K n to H 1 shows that any black-box reduction from G n to H 1 is lossy. In summary, we show that for almost any variant G n of the general n-key security game and for
, if E is "secure" in the sense of H 1 and C[E] is keyunique, then any black-box reduction from G n to H 1 with a "reasonable" runtime loses approximately n.
Related Work. The idea of using a weak auxiliary security game to prove that reductions are lossy for more meaningful games was pioneered by Bader et al. for public key primitives [3] . Bader et al. considered as their H 1 notion a non-interactive assumption, whereas our H 1 games are highly interactive. The main obstacle here is that our meta-reduction needs to simulate an appropriate environment towards n copies of the reduction, while having access only to a single set of oracles for the considered single-key game. Thus we are forced to devise an additional mechanism that allows the meta-reduction to simulate responses to the oracle queries made by R and prove that R cannot distinguish this simulation from the real oracles in its game.
Multi-key security was first considered in the public key setting [6] , extending the LRIND-CCA notion to a single-bit multi-key setting without corruptions. A simple hybrid argument shows the loss of security is at most linear in the number of keys; furthermore this loss is inevitable as demonstrated by a counterexample. Relatedly, for many schemes a generic key recovery attack exists whose success probability is linear in both time and the number of keys n [11, 12, 23] . For schemes where this generic key recovery attack is actually the best attack (in both the single-key and n-key games), this shows that security in the n-key setting is indeed n times less than in the single-key setting. However, even for very secure schemes it is unlikely that key recovery is the optimum strategy for e.g. distinguishing genuine ciphertexts from random strings.
The danger of ignoring the loss in reductions between security notions is by now widely understood [16, 17] and has served as motivation for work on improved security analysis that avoid the loss of generic reductions. Recent results include multi-user security for Even-Mansour [34], AES-GCM with nonce randomisation [10] , double encryption [27] , and block ciphers [44] .
Tightness is better understood in the public key setting than in the symmetric setting. There are, for instance, many constructions of (identity-based) public-key encryption [6, 14, 18, 25, 29] , digital signatures [1, 13, 28, 32, 33, 42] , key exchange protocols [2] , as well as several different types of lower bounds and impossibility results [19, 22, 24, 30, 36] . We emphasise that, for signature schemes and public key encryption schemes, 'tightly secure' means that the reduction from the scheme to some complexity assumption does not incur a multiplicative loss equal to the number of signing or encryption queries.
There exist several other previous works describing meta-reductions from interactive problems, such as the one-more discrete logarithm (OMDL) problem [20, 24, 36, 43] . However, all these works have in common that they consider a significantly simpler setting, where the reduction is rewound a much smaller number of times (typically only once), and with only a single oracle (the discrete logarithm oracle).
Preliminaries
Notation. For any integer n ≥ 1 we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n} and for any i ∈ [n] we use [n\i] to denote the set [n] \ {i}. For any finite set S we write x ←$ S to indicate that x is drawn uniformly at random from S. In any security experiment, if an adversary A has worst-case runtime t, then we say A is a t-adversary. When A is clear from the context, we write t A for its worst case runtime. Since our security notions are concrete, rather than asymptotic (as is standard for symmetric cryptography), we loosely use the term "secure" to mean that, for all reasonable values of t, the advantage of any tadversary in the relevant security game is close to 0. Of course, what constitutes a "reasonable" runtime depends on the model of computation and is beyond the scope of this work.
Authenticated Encryption
Syntax. Both the syntax and security definitions for symmetric and then authenticated encryption have evolved over the years. We will use the modern perspective where encryption is deterministic and takes in not just a key and a message, but also a nonce, which could be used to provide an explicit form of randomization. Our syntax is summarised in Definition 1 and is a simplification of that used for subtle authenticated encryption [5] . For simplicity, we omit any associated data, though our later results could be extended to that setting; moreover we are not interested in the 'subtle' aspect, where decryption might 'leak', e.g. unverified plaintext or multiple error symbols.
Definition 1 (Authenticated Encryption
). An authenticated encryption scheme is a pair of deterministic algorithms (E, D) satisfying
where K, M, N and C are subsets of {0, 1} * whose elements are called keys, messages, nonces and ciphertexts respectively. The unique failure symbol ⊥ indicates that C was not a valid encryption under the key K with nonce N .
Single-Key Security Notions. An authenticated encryption scheme should provide both confidentiality and authenticity. When defining an adversary's advantage, we separate these orthogonal properties by looking at the IND-PAS and CTI-CPA security games, while also considering their combination AE-PAS in a single game [39] . Below we discuss these notions in more detail, however we defer formal definitions of the relevant games and advantages to the next section, where they will be viewed as a special case of the multi-key games given in Definition 7 (cf. Remark 9).
The notions IND-PAS, CTI-CPA and AE-PAS are commonly called IND-CPA, for indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack; INT-CTXT, for integrity of ciphertexts; and AE, for authenticated encryption (respectively). However, we adhere to the GOAL-POWER naming scheme [5] . It makes explicit that, in the first case, the adversary's goal is to distinguish between real ciphertexts and random strings (IND, for indistinguishability) without access to any additional oracles (PAS, for passive); in the second case, the adversary's goal is to forge a well-formed ciphertext (CTI, for ciphertext integrity) and has access to an 'always-real' encryption oracle (CPA, for chosen plaintext attack); and in the third case, the adversary tries to either distinguish real ciphertexts from random strings or forge a well-formed ciphertext (AE, for authenticated encryption), without having access to any additional oracles (PAS). For the notions above, we opted for minimal adversarial powers: it is often possible to trade queries to additional oracles (such as a true encryption oracle) for queries to the challenge oracle. We refer to Barwell et al. [5] for an overview of known relations between various notions.
Nonce Usage Convention. All three of the games above have variants according to how nonces may be used by the adversary in the game:
1. In the IV-based setting, denoted IV, the adversary is required to choose nonces uniformly at random for each encryption query. 2. In the nonce-respecting setting, denoted NR, the adversary chooses nonces adaptively for each encryption query, but may never use the same nonce in more than one encryption query. 3. In the misuse-resistant setting, denoted MR, the adversary chooses nonces adaptively for each encryption query and may use the same nonce in more than one encryption query.
Remark 2. The customary definition for IV-based security lets the game select the IVs [35] . We prefer the recent alternative [5] that provides the same interface across the various notions by restricting the class of valid adversaries in the IV-based setting to those who always provide uniformly random nonces in encryption queries. (Note that there is no need to check the distribution of nonces.) This gives a subtly stronger notion, as a reduction will no longer be able to 'program' the IV, which it would be allowed to do in the classical definition (cf. [21, 31] ). The results in this paper hold with the alternative, customary formulation of IV-based encryption, with only cosmetic changes to the proof (to take into account the changed interface).
Different Confidentiality Goals. Above we captured the confidentiality goal IND as distinguishing between real ciphertexts and random strings of the appropriate length. However, there are several competing notions to capture confidentiality, all captured by considering a different challenge encryption oracle: 
, where $ is a random string of the same length as M . -In pseudorandom-injection indistinguishability the challenge oracle, on input (M, N ), returns either
, where ρ is a suitably sampled family of random injections [26, 39] . In the single-key setting, these four notions can be partitioned into two groups of two each, namely left-or-right and real-or-random on the one hand and IND and pseudorandom-injection indistinguishability on the other. Within each group, the two notions can be considered equivalent, as an adversary against one can be turned into an adversary against the other with the same resources and a closely related advantage. Furthermore, security in the IND setting trivially implies security in the LRIND setting, but not vice versa.
Summary. Thus, for each authenticated encryption scheme E, we potentially obtain 5 × 4 = 20 security games (see Fig. 2 ) and for each we need to consider three classes of adversary depending on nonce usage behaviour. However, for single-key security, we will concentrate on nine notions only, namely G X,1 E , where
and where the 1 in the superscript indicates that these are single-key security games.
Remark 3. In this paper we use meta-reductions to analyse reductions from multi-key games to singlekey games for authenticated encryption. We show that, for any AE scheme that is secure in a single-key sense, any reduction from the multi-key game to the single-key game is lossy. We do not need to consider equivalent single-key notions separately, as any scheme that is secure according to one notion will be secure according to the other, and one can convert between the single-key games without (significant) additional loss. From this perspective, we can leverage known equivalences as mentioned above. However, the set {AE-PAS, IND-PAS, CTI-CPA} does not provide a comprehensive set of meta-reduction results; for that we would have to consider for example LRIND-PAS and IND-CCA as well (the full set would contain eight games). Nevertheless, our results capture the single-key notions that are most commonly used.
Black-Box Reductions
Informally, a reduction R is an algorithm that transforms an adversary A in some security game G into an adversary R(A) in a different security game G . One hopes that, if the advantage Adv G (A) of A in G is high, then the advantage Adv G (R(A)) is also high. Here R breaks some scheme E, given an adversary A that breaks a construction C[E] that uses E. The construction C is typically fixed, so the reduction R may depend on it (though to unclutter notation we leave this dependency implicit). On the contrary, when discussing the reduction R, E is crucially quantified over some class of schemes C. Three properties of a reduction R are usually of interest: how the resources, specifically run-time, of the resulting adversary R(A) relate to those of A; how the reduction translates the success of A to that of R(A); and how 'lossy' this translation is, i.e. how Adv G (R(A)) compares to Adv G (A). The overall picture for a reduction, especially its loss, strongly depends on the class C of schemes considered. Formally, we take into account both the translation S and the relation T in runtime into account by considering the quotient of A and R(A)'s work factors, themselves defined as the quotient of time over success probability (cf. [3] ).
. Furthermore, the tightness of a reduction R relative to the class of schemes C is defined as
where the supremum is taken over all schemes E in C and all (valid) adversaries A against E.
Remark 5. Our quantification over valid adversaries only is inspired by the AE literature's reliance on only considering adversaries satisfying certain behaviour (e.g. to avoid trivial wins, or distinguish between IV, NR, and MR settings). In all cases, one can recast to a security game that incorporates checks and balances to deal with arbitrary adversarial behaviour. This recasting is without loss of generality as an adversary in this more general game will be 'aware' that it is making a 'bad' query and this bad behaviour does not influence the state of the game (cf. [8] ). Of course, when determining S we do need to take into account whether the reduction R preserves validity.
In this paper we are concerned with simple, black-box reductions: these are reductions that have only black-box access to adversary A, and that run A precisely once (without rewinding). For a (S, T) simple reduction R we have that T(t A ) = t A + t R , where t R is the time taken for whatever additional work R does. Henceforth, we write t R for this quantity, whenever R is a simple reduction.
These reductions compose in the obvious way: if
Bounding Tightness. Precisely evaluating the tightness of a reduction can be difficult, yet to show that for schemes in C any simple reduction R loses at least some factor L, it suffices to show that for any R there exists a scheme E ∈ C and a valid adversary A such that
Indeed, the desired lower bound follows since, for simple reductions, T(t A ) ≥ t A . We briefly discuss two distinct techniques to establish a bound such as the one above, in which the order of quantifiers is (∀R∃E∃A):
-Counterexample (∃E∀A∀R). Here, one shows that there exists a scheme E ∈ C such that for any adversary A and any reduction R, inequality 1 is satisfied. One drawback of such results is that they only imply the desired lowerbound for a class of schemes C containing E; tighter reductions might be possible in the class C := C \ {E}. Moreover, if the counterexample scheme E is an artificially insecure scheme (e.g. the one used by Bellare et al. [6] ), then the lowerbound might not hold within the class of secure schemes, which are obviously of greater significance in practice.
-Meta-reduction Lowerbound (∀E∃A∀R). For any E ∈ C, this technique constructs an idealised adversary A with advantage 1 and then shows, via a meta-reduction simulating A, that any simple reduction interacting with A must have advantage at most L −1 , yielding inequality 1. Thus we show that the loss is a property of the reduction R, and not of the particular choice of E ∈ C. The results in this paper, using the meta-reduction approach, hold when C is any non-empty subset of the class of secure schemes that satisfy the key uniqueness assumption. Since C could contain just one element E, our results show that even a reduction that is tailored to the specific details of E cannot be tight.
On the other hand, our results are not directly comparable to those of Bellare et al. [6] , since the artificially insecure scheme used in their counterexample does not belong to any class C we consider here.
Remark 6. An alternative definition of tightness might consider only 'reasonable' adversaries A in the supremum, namely those for which t A is not too large. Our meta-reduction approach would not work in this setting, since the idealised adversary A we construct has an extremely large (and wholly unfeasible) runtime as it performs an exhaustive search over all possible keys. Nevertheless, reductions R that are black-box with respect to A have no way of 'excluding' such unrealistic adversaries and so we feel it is not reasonable to exclude them in the definition of tightness. We remark that unrealistic adversaries are not uncommon in the meta-reduction literature [3] .
Multi-Key Security Notions
Multi-Key Security with Adaptive Corruptions. In the single-key case, the challenge oracles depend on a single hidden bit b and it is the job of the adversary to try and learn b. The straightforward generalization [6] to a multi-key setting (with n keys) is to enrich all the oracles to include the index i ∈ [n] of the key K i that will then be used by the oracle. Thus the challenge oracles for distinct keys will all depend on the same single hidden bit b. However, in a realistic multi-key setting, an adversary might well learn some of the keys. For instance, consider the situation where an attacker passively monitors millions of TLS connections and adaptively implants malware on particular endpoint devices in order to recover the session keys for those devices. We still want security for those keys that have not been compromised; the question is how to appropriately model multi-key security.
There are two natural approaches to model multi-key security games in the presence of an adaptive corruption oracle Cor that, on input i ∈ [n], returns the key K i . The approaches differ in how they avoid trivial wins that occur when the adversary corrupts a key that was used for a challenge query. In one approach, the same bit is used for the challenge queries throughout, but the adversary is prohibited from using the same index i for both a corruption and challenge query (cf.
[37]). In another approach, for each index i there is an independent hidden bit b i to guess and the adversary has to specify for which uncorrupted index its guess b is intended (cf. [9] ).
As far as we are aware, these two approaches have not been formally compared; moreover we could not easily establish a tight relationship between them. However, as we show, both options lead to a reduction loss linear in n. To do so, we will use a novel way of formalizing a multi-key security game with adaptive corruptions that encompasses both options mentioned above.
In our generalised game (Definition 7) there are n independently, uniformly sampled random bits b 1 , . . . , b n . Each challenge query from the adversary must specify two indices, i, j ∈ [n], such that the response to the query depends on key K i and hidden bit b j . The two 'natural' multi-key games are special cases of this general game: in the single-bit game the adversary is restricted to challenge queries with j = 1, whereas in the multi-bit game only challenge queries with i = j are allowed.
Our impossibility results hold regardless how the hidden bits are used: we only require that for any i ∈ [n] there exists some j ∈ [n] such that the adversary can make a challenge query corresponding to K i and b j . In other words, our impossibility results hold provided that the adversary can win the game by 'attacking' any of the n keys in the game, not just some subset of the keys.
games, where X ∈ {IV, NR, MR}, n ≥ 1, GOAL ∈ {AE, LRAE, IND, LRIND, CTI} and POWER ∈ {CCA, CPA, CDA, PAS}. The oracles O available to the adversary always include the corruption oracle Cor; the other oracles depend on GOAL and POWER, as indicated in Fig. 2 .
Oracle D(i, C, N ):
Oracle Cor(i): Then for any authenticated encryption scheme E and adversary A, the advantage of A against E with respect to GOAL-POWER X,n is defined as
where the experiment GOAL-POWER Fig. 3 , with the oracles' behaviour shown in Fig. 4 and their GOAL-POWER-dependent availability in Fig. 2 (all games have access to Cor).
Whenever the experiment G = GOAL-POWER X,n E (A) is clear from the context, we write Adv
for the advantage of A in experiment G. The outline games are deliberately kept simple, but are trivial to win: if A corrupts a key K i and then issues a challenge query corresponding to K i and a hidden bit b j , then it is trivial for A to compute b j from the response to the query; successfully 'guessing' b j does not represent a meaningful attack. In our formal syntax, we say j is compromised iff there is some i ∈ [n] such that A has issued a query Cor(i) and A has also issued some challenge query of the form Enc(i, j, −, −), LR(i, j, −, −, −) or Dec(i, j, −, −). We disallow such trivial wins.
Relatedly, we follow the AE literature in disallowing certain combinations of queries that lead to trivial wins (prohibited queries), or that are inconsistent with the nonce notion under consideration.
Return (Ki * = K * ) Fig. 5 . Key recovery game with n keys and the hard-coded messages M1, . . . , M l . Without loss of generality, we separate the adversary A into two components A1 and A2.
Without loss of generality, we also disallow queries where the response from the oracle can be computed by the adversary directly without making the query, e.g. using correctness (pointless queries). The relevant-and standard-definitions are given in Appendix A. Combining the various restrictions leads to the notion of valid adversaries (cf. Remark 5), as summarised in Definition 8 below.
Definition 8 (Valid Adversaries). An adversary against GOAL-POWER
X,n E is valid iff:
1. it does not output j, b j where j was compromised; 2. it does not make pointless or prohibited queries; 3. it uses nonces correctly with respect to X.
Remark 9 (Recovering the Single-Key Security Notions). Setting n = 1 in Definition 7 yields formal definitions of the single-key security games for authenticated encryption, albeit with a more complicated interface than one is used to: the specification of i and j becomes redundant, as does the corruption oracle for valid adversaries. Indeed, to simplify notation in the case n = 1, we often omit i and j from the queries made, refer to the hidden bit b 1 as b, and only expect a simple guess b by an adversary.
Relations among Multi-Key Notions. We discuss the relations between different single-user and multiuser security notions in Appendix B.
Key Recovery Notions. For our meta-reduction, we use an auxiliary, key recovery game KEYREC M ,n E (Definition 10). Here there are n unknown keys and the adversary is provided with encryptions under each of the keys of the hard-coded (and hence known) messages M ∈ M l , using known, yet random, nonces. Then the adversary provides an index i * ∈ [n], learns the n − 1 keys (K i ) i∈[n\i * ] and tries to guess the uncorrupted key.
where the experiment KEYREC M ,n E (A) is given in Fig. 5 .
Of course, it might be the case that it is impossible to win the key recovery game with certainty, since there could be more than one key that 'matches' the messages, nonces and ciphertexts. For our tightness results, we need to assume that there is some reasonably small l and some messages M 1 , . . . , M l such that the key recovery game corresponding to M 1 , . . . , M l can be won with certainty; we call this the key uniqueness property; its definition is below. Definition 11. Let E be an authenticated encryption scheme. Suppose there is some integer l ≥ 1 and certain messages M 1 , . . . , M l ∈ M such that,for all keys K ∈ K and all nonces N 1 , . . . , N l ∈ N,
Then we say E is M -key-unique, where M = (M 1 , . . . , M l ) ∈ M l . This means that encryptions of M 1 , . . . , M l under the same key uniquely determine the key, regardless of the nonces used.
As mentioned above, KEYREC M ,n E corresponds to a very weak notion of security. In the following Lemma, we prove that this weak notion of security is implied, with only a small loss, by many of the more reasonable n-key security notions given in Definition 7. For succinctness we present the reduction in a compact way, but split the analysis in different cases (depending on the adversary goal and on the requirements to respect uniqueness or not).
Lemma 12. Let GOAL ∈ {AE, LRAE, IND, LRIND, CTI}, POWER ∈ {CCA, CPA} and suppose E is M -key-unique. Then there exists an (S, T) simple reduction from KEYREC
t E is a bound on the runtime of a single encryption with E;
Note that δ X and δ GOAL are both close to 1: m can be set arbitrarily large and, for useful encryption schemes, the nonce space N is very large.
Remark 13. We are unable to show a corresponding result for POWER = CDA or POWER = PAS. This is because we need the 'always real' encryption oracle E to simulate the environment of A in the key recovery game. As a consequence, looking forward, our lower bounds for tightness of simple reductions hold only for n-key games with such an oracle. Nevertheless, we feel it is natural to give the n-key adversary access to the E oracle so that, for example, the adversary can use queries to this oracle to determine which keys to corrupt and which to challenge.
Proof. We construct R A that runs the key recovery adversary A to obtain the key used by the challenge oracle(s) and then uses it to guess the hidden bit b 1 . Therefore R A will return (1, b 1 ) and wins if b 1 = b 1 . For each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [l], R A samples N i,j ←$ N and then queries the encryption oracle E on input (i, M j , N i,j ), receiving C i,j (unless R A has made this query before, since this is a pointless query, in which case it just sets C i,j to be the response from the last time the query was made). Then R A passes
If not, then A has been unsuccessful, so R A samples a random bit b 1 ←${0, 1} and returns (1, b 1 ) . If the tests all succeed, then by M -key-uniqueness, K * = K i * . Then R A does the following:
For GOAL ∈ {LRIND, AE, LRAE, CTI}, the adversary R A returns (1, b) with b = b 1 whenever the adversary A against key recovery is successful.
For GOAL ∈ {IND}, the adversary R A always returns the correct bit if b 1 = 1. It also returns the correct bit b 1 = 0, provided that the random ciphertexts (C * i ) i∈ [m] that oracle Enc returns do not all collide with the true ciphertexts E
. This collision event occurs with probability at most 1 2 m . In other words, for GOAL ∈ {IND, LRIND, AE, LRAE, CTI}
from which we obtain
Ignoring the time taken for random sampling, the runtime of R A is precisely the runtime of A, plus the time taken for additional encryptions using K * : if GOAL = IND, there are l + m additional encryptions and, if GOAL = IND, there are l + 1 additional encryptions. It follows that
where m IND = m and m GOAL = 1 for GOAL = IND.
Moreover, R A , doesn't compromise b 1 and makes no pointless or prohibited queries: no queries are repeated, the messages used to generate the challenge queries do not appear in any of the previous encryption queries under key K i * and, in the LRIND case, the challenge messages are of equal length. It follows that R A is a valid adversary against GOAL-POWER X,n E for X ∈ {IV, MR}, since nonces are always chosen uniformly at random.
If X = NR, R A might not be a valid adversary, since the randomly chosen nonces might accidentally collide. So we modify R A to abort and output a random bit whenever there is a collision among the l randomly chosen nonces (N i,j ) j∈ [l] for each i ∈ [n \ i * ], or among the l + m GOAL randomly chosen nonces for encryptions under K i * : the l + m nonces (N i * ,j ) j∈ [l] and (N * i ) i∈ [m] , if GOAL = IND, and the l + 1 nonces (N i * ,j ) j∈ [l] and N * , if GOAL = IND. Then R A is a valid adversary and its advantage is A multiplied by the probability that no such nonce collisions happen. By a simple union bound the probability of a collision among the l randomly chosen nonces (N i,j ) j∈ [l] is at most
2|N| for each i ∈ [n \ i * ] and the probability of a collision among the l + m GOAL randomly chosen nonces for i * is at most (l+m GOAL )(l+m GOAL −1) 2|N|
. Thus the probability of a collision among the nonces for any of the n keys is at most
Thus the advantage of R
Remark 14. In the proof, we assumed that the adversary is allowed to associate the bit b 1 with any of the n keys K 1 , . . . , K n . While this is permitted according to our definition of the GOAL-POWER n,X E game, in fact the result holds for more restrictive games: we only require that for all i ∈ [n] there exists some j ∈ [n] such that the adversary can associate the bit b j with the key K i . In this case, R A uses the recovered key K * from A to determine the value of any hidden bit b j that can be associated with K i * .
Multi-Key to Single-Key Reductions are Lossy
In this section we present our main results: any simple black-box reduction from multi-key security (in its many definitional variants) to single-key security loses a linear factor in the number of keys. Two remarks are in order. First, we show the lower bound for reductions from the security of an arbitrary construction of an (authenticated) encryption scheme C[E] to that of E (and in particular for the case where C[E] = E). This more general setting encompasses interesting cases, e.g. where C[E] is double encryption with E, i.e.
C[E]
which has been shown to have desirable multi-key properties [27] . Furthermore, showing the separation for C[E] and E also suggests how to circumvent the lower bound for the loss that we provide. Our lower bound requires that C[E] satisfies key-uniqueness. It may therefore be possible to start from a secure single-key security that satisfies key-uniqueness, and show a tight reduction from multi-key security of a variant C[E] of E, provided that C[E] somehow avoids key uniqueness. We consider separately reductions between different security flavours (authenticated encryption, privacy, integrity). For each case in turn, we proceed in two steps. First, we establish that if E is a (singlekey) secure encryption scheme and C[E] is a key-unique encryption scheme, then all simple reductions from the multi-key key recovery game for C[E] to the single-key security game for E are lossy. Since by Lemma 12 there is a tight reduction from multi-key key recovery to multi-key security, it is an immediate corollary that there is no tight reduction from the multi-key security of C[E] to the single-key security of E.
An interesting remark is that the bound on the inherent loss of simple reductions depends on the security of the scheme E: the more secure the scheme, the tighter the bound. While our bound is therefore not meaningful for insecure schemes, this case is of little interest in practice.
Authenticated Encryption. We give the formal results for the case of authenticated encryption below. We sketch the proof before giving its details below. The crucial idea, following [3] , is to construct a meta-reduction M that rewinds the reduction R in order to simulate its interaction with an ideal adversary A against KEYREC M ,n C [E] . If the simulation works correctly, then the output of R can be used by M to win the AE-PAS X,1 E game with probability R . Then the (single-key) security of E yields an upper-bound on the success probability of M, i.e. an upper-bound on R .
We view R as a collection of three algorithms, R = (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ). The first, R 1 , makes oracle queries in the AE-PAS X,1 E game, then produces the ciphertexts and nonces that A expects to receive in the KEYREC M ,n C[E] game. The second, R 2 , receives an index i * from A and the state st 1 of the previous algorithm, R 1 
M only rewinds R 2 : M executes R 2 on each of the n possible indices i * that could be returned by A and each R 2 then returns a set of keys. Then M uses the keys returned by one execution of R 2 to construct the input to a different execution of R 3 , i.e. st 2 given to R 3 will not be from the same execution of R 2 used to construct the 'guessed' key K * .
The main obstacle in arguing that the above strategy works is that M needs to break AE-PAS
E , which is an interactive assumption. This is in contrast to the meta-reductions from [3] , which are designed to violate a non-interactive complexity assumption. In our case, M needs to simulate an appropriate environment towards multiple copies of R, each of which may make oracle queries, yet M has access to a single set of oracles for the AE-PAS X,1 E game. It is not obvious that M can simply forward queries from all copies of R to these oracles, since queries across different invocations of R may interfere with one-another and render M invalid. The key observation is that we can leverage the single-key security of E: instead of forwarding queries, M simply simulates the Enc and Dec oracles by sampling random ciphertexts and returning ⊥, respectively. We argue, based on the security of E, that R cannot distinguish this simulation from the real oracles in its game.
Proof. For ease of notation, let K, M, N and C be the sets of keys, messages, nonces and ciphertexts, respectively, for the construction C[E] (even though they may differ from the corresponding sets for E, but we shall not need to refer to those in the proof).
Consider the following (inefficient) adversary
A 1 first checks that each C i,j ∈ C and each N i,j ∈ N. If this check fails, then A 1 aborts (by outputting a random index i * ∈ [n] and recording an abort message in the state st A for A 2 , triggering the latter to output ⊥). If the check succeeds, then A 1 chooses i * ∈ [n] uniformly at random, sets
and outputs (i * , st A ). On input
If this check fails, then A 2 outputs ⊥. If the check succeeds, then A 2 uses exhaustive search to find some K * ∈ K such that C[E]
is M -key-unique, either K * exists and is unique, or the ciphertexts C i * ,j were not all encryptions of the messages M j with the nonces N i * ,j under the same key. So if A 2 does not find a K * with this property, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise it outputs K * .
It is clear that the advantage of A is A = 1 since, in the real KEYREC M ,n C[E] game, all the checks performed by A will succeed and K * is uniquely defined.
We construct a meta-reduction M that simulates the environment of R in its interaction with this ideal adversary A. Then M will use the output of R to play the AE-PAS
game. In what follows, we describe M in detail. A diagram showing the overall structure of the interaction between M and R is given in Fig. 6 .
6. An overview of the meta-reduction M, which rewinds a reduction R = (R1, R2, R3). The inputs to each component of the reduction R are shown in teal, while the outputs are shown in blue. Some oracle queries from R are forwarded to the oracles in the game played by M and the responses sent back, while other oracle queries from R are faked by M.
First, K * is initialised to ⊥. Then, M uses its oracles to simulate the oracles used by R 1 by simply forwarding the queries from R 1 and the responses from the oracles, until R 1 returns
Then M checks that each C i,j ∈ C and each N i,j ∈ N. If this check fails, M 'aborts' just as A would. That is, M runs R 2 on input (i, st 1 ) for a random index i * ∈ [n], forwarding oracle queries and responses, receives (K i ) i∈[n\i * ] , st 2 from R 2 , runs R 3 on input (⊥, st 2 ), receives a bit b and outputs this in its game. If, on the other hand, the check succeeds, then M chooses i * uniformly at random from [n] and does the following for each i ∈ [n]:
1. M runs R 2 on input (i, st 1 ), which we call R i 2 for ease of readability. 2. When R i 2 makes oracle queries: (a) If i = i * , M uses its oracles to honestly answer all oracle queries; forwarding the queries to its oracles and then forwarding the replies to R i * 2 . (b) If i = i * , M simulates the 'fake' oracles, i.e. the oracles Enc and Dec in the case b = 1.
Concretely, when R i 2 makes an encryption query (M, N ), M samples C ←${0, 1} enclen(|M |) and returns this to
By M -key-uniqueness, K i i * is the only key with this property.
At the end of these runs of R 2 , if R i * 2 did not provide a full set of valid keys, i.e. K i * r is not valid for some r ∈ [n \ i * ], then M sets K * ← ⊥ (mirroring the check performed by A 2 ).
If R i * 2 did provide a full set of valid keys, but K * = ⊥, (so none of the R i 2 , i = i * provided a valid key K i i * ), M aborts the simulation and returns a random bit. We call this event BAD. Otherwise, M runs R 3 on input K * , st i * 2 , forwarding oracle queries from R 3 to its oracles and sending back the responses.
When R 3 outputs a bit b , M returns this bit in its game. Now we consider the resources of M and its advantage in the AE-PAS X,1 E game. M performs n runs of (part of) R and carries out 2(n − 1)l encryptions with C[E] (checking validity of K i i * for each i = i * and checking validity of K i * r for each r = i * ), so if we ignore the time taken for random sampling and checking set membership, the runtime of M is at most nt R + 2l(n − 1)t , so R must always be a valid adversary against AE-PAS X,1 E . Now the oracle queries M makes are exactly the same queries as R 1 , R i * 2 , R 3 makes in the same game. Since R is a valid adversary, this shows that M does not make pointless or prohibited queries and uses nonces correctly with respect to X. Therefore M is a valid adversary against AE-PAS X,1 E and so M ≤ .
Note that for R 1 , R i * 2 and R 3 , M answers the oracle queries honestly with its own oracles. Therefore M correctly simulates the view of R 1 , R i * 2 , R 3 in the game AE-PAS X,1 E . However, M might not correctly simulate the responses from A. Indeed, to correctly simulate A, M requires that some R i 2 , i = i * provides a valid key K i i * , but the oracle queries from R i 2 , i = i * are not handled honestly. The imperfect simulation of the view of R i 2 might make it less likely to provide a valid key K i i * . We will therefore need to show that the change in behaviour of the R i 2 due to the imperfect simulation is small. The intuition for this claim is that if R i 2 could distinguish between the honest and the simulated oracles (having only received an index i from the key-recovery adversary A, not a key), then one can use (R 1 , R i 2 ) directly, without A, to win the single-key game AE-PAS X,1 E . Consider the three possible scenarios:
1. R i * 2 did not provide a full set of valid keys. 2. R i * 2 did provide a full set of valid keys and, for some i = i * , R i 2 provided a valid key K i i * . 3. R i * 2 did provide a full set of valid keys, but, for each i = i * , R i 2 did not provide a valid key K i i * .
In the first case, both M and A submit ⊥ to R 3 as their 'key', so the simulation is correct. In the second case, both M and A submit a key K * to R 3 that satisfies C[E]
, and K * is the only key with this property by the M -key-uniqueness of C [E] . So the simulation is correct in this case too.
The third case is the event BAD and is where the simulation fails. By construction M aborts the simulation if BAD occurs and outputs a random bit. Given that BAD does not occur, the view of R 1 , R i * 2 , R 3 in its interaction with A and the AE-PAS X,1 E oracles is identical to its view in its interaction with M and M returns the bit b returned by R 3 . This shows that Pr AE-PAS X,1
Write W X (M) ('Win') for the event AE-PAS 
Then,
It follows that:
Adv
To complete the proof we bound the probability of BAD (see the next lemma) by Pr [BAD] ≤ 1 n + . We therefore get that
, as required to show that R loses
Proof. Consider a meta-reduction M in the AE-PAS X,1 E game that executes R 1 and each R i 2 , i ∈ [n] exactly as M does, but without treating R i * 2 differently. That is, encryption and decryption queries from R i * 2 are 'faked' in the same way as for the other R i 2 , i = i * . Such an M could have chosen i * ←$[n] after executing each R i 2 , simply by storing all the keys output by each R i 2 , and then, once i * had been chosen, checking if R i * 2 returned a full set of valid keys and if each K i i * was valid for i = i * . Note that the probability of BAD occuring for M does not depend on whether i * was chosen at the start of executing the R i 2 , or at the end, since M runs each R i 2 in the same way. Moreover, after executing each R i 2 , there can be at most one j ∈ [n] such that R j 2 returned a full set of valid keys but for each i = j, R i 2 did not provide a full set of valid keys. Therefore there can be at most one j ∈ [n] such that R j 2 returned a full set of valid keys but for each i = j, R i 2 did not provide a valid key K i j . Since i * was sampled uniformly from [n], the probability that i * has the latter property, i.e. that BAD occurs for M , is at most Then
Now we construct an adversary B that simulates the environment of R 1 and the R i 2 in their interaction with either M or M , depending on the hidden bit b in the game played by B. If BAD occurs, B will output 0. Otherwise B will output 1.
Consider B in the AE-CCA X,1 E game. That is, B has access to the usual challenge oracles Enc and Dec, but can also query the 'always real' oracles E and D (provided it does not make pointless or prohibited queries). But if B has significant advantage in this game, then there is another adversary, with the same resources as B, that has significant advantage against AE-PAS
Lemma 17. Suppose A is a valid adversary against AE-CCA X,1 E , where X ∈ {IV, NR, MR}. Then
where is the maximum advantage of a valid adversary against AE-PAS X,1 E that runs in the same time as A and makes the same number of oracle queries as A.
The proof of Lemma 17 is in Appendix C. We remark that a similar statement can be easily derived by combining results from an existing work [5] . However, this approach only shows that the advantage in AE-CCA X,1 E is at most four times the maximum advantage in AE-PAS X,1 E , whereas proving the statement directly gives a tighter bound. Now we describe the adversary B in the AE-CCA Finally, B checks if BAD has occured. If so B outputs 0. Otherwise, B outputs 1. Let b be the hidden bit in the game played by B. So the oracle queries from R 1 will always be 'real' (as they are for M and M , given that b = 0), the oracle queries from R i 2 for i = i * will always be 'fake' (as they are for M and M ) and, depending on b , the oracle queries from R i * 2 will be real ( 
Like M (or M ), B performs n runs of (part of) R and carries out 2(n − 1)l encryptions to check if BAD has occured. So the runtime of B is at most nt R + 2l(n − 1)t C [E] . Moreover B makes at most q R oracle queries (only forwarding queries from R 1 and R i * 2 ). Consider Adv AE-CCA,X,1 E (B). Firstly, note that B uses nonces correctly with respect to X, since any query to Enc or E is a query made to Enc by R 1 , R i * 2 , R 3 and R is a valid adversary against AE-PAS X,1 E . Also, B will not make pointless queries: -A repeated query to E or D by B would be a repeated query to Enc or Dec from R 1 , which is a pointless or prohibited query in the game played by R. -A repeated query to Dec by B would be a repeated query to Dec from R i * 2 , which is a pointless query in the game played by R. -A query D(C, N ) by B, where C was the response to a query E(M, N ), would be a query Dec (C, N ) from R 1 , where C was the response to a query Enc(M, N ), which is a prohibited query in the game played by R. -A query E(M, N ) by B, where M = ⊥ was the response to a query D(C, N ), would be a query Enc(M, N ) from R 1 , where M = ⊥ was the response to a query Dec(C, N ), which is a pointless query in the game played by R. -Finally, suppose B makes a query E(M, N ) or Enc(M, N ), where M = ⊥ was the response to a query Dec(C, N ). The query Dec(C, N ) from B would correspond to a query Dec(C, N ) from R i * 2 and so the subsequent encryption query would correspond to a query Enc(M, N ) from R i * 2 . But as M = ⊥ this is a pointless query for R.
Moreover, B will not make prohibited queries:
-A repeated query to Enc by B would be a repeated query to Enc from R i * 2 , which is a prohibited query in the game played by R.
-Suppose B makes two queries of the form Enc(M, N ) and E(M, N ). Each of these queries would correspond to the same query Enc(M, N ) from R, which is prohibited in the game played by R. -A query D(C, N ) from B, where C was the response to a query Enc(M, N ), is impossible since B only queries Enc and Dec after querying E and D. -A query Dec(C, N ) from B, where C was the response to a query E(M, N ) or Enc(M, N ), would correspond to a query Dec(C, N ) from R i * 2 , where C was the response to a query Enc(M, N ) from R 1 or R i * 2 , which is a prohibited query in the game played by R. -A query Enc(M, N ) from B, where M = ⊥ was the response to a query D(C, N ), would correspond to a query Enc(M, N ) from R i * 2 , where M = ⊥ was the response to a query Dec(C, N ) from R 1 , which is a pointless query in the game played by R.
It follows that B is a valid adversary against Adv AE-CCA,X,1 E (B). Then, by Lemma 17, we have
from which the result follows.
Theorem 15 establishes that reductions from KEYREC
are lossy. By Lemma 12,  there exists a tight reduction from KEYREC
(for POWER ∈ {CCA, CPA}); it immediately follows that reductions from GOAL-POWER X ,n C[E] to AE-PAS X,1 E must be lossy (for POWER ∈ {CCA, CPA}). We formalise this intuition in the following corollary:
Corollary 18. Let E and C[E] be AE schemes such that C[E] is M -key-unique for some M ∈ M l . Then for GOAL ∈ {AE, LRAE, IND, LRIND, CTI}, POWER ∈ {CCA, CPA}, X, X ∈ {IV, NR, MR} and n > 1, all simple reductions from GOAL-POWER
, where δ GOAL and δ X are as in Lemma 12 and is as given in Theorem 15.
We emphasise that the 'nonce use' parameters X , X ∈ {IV, NR, MR} can differ between the nkey game and the single key game. While it is natural to consider X = X we prefer to state the result in full generality and show that a very large class of reductions are necessarily lossy. Note that multi-key games for POWER ∈ {PAS, CDA} are not known to be (tightly) equivalent to those where POWER ∈ {CCA, CPA} (see Appendix B). It therefore remains an open problem to obtain tightness lowerbounds for POWER ∈ {PAS, CDA}.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 12 the (S, T)-simple reduction from KEYREC
, which we call R.
We argue by contradiction. Suppose there is a simple reduction R from GOAL-POWER
But this is a contradiction since, by Theorem 15, for any simple reduction R from KEYREC
Thus for any simple reduction R from GOAL-POWER
Privacy and Integrity. The above results hold for notions of authenticated encryption schemes. It is natural to ask whether the loss for simple reductions from GOAL-POWER
is an artefact of considering the two orthogonal single-key security properties of secrecy and authenticity at the same time. Perhaps it is possible to circumvent the loss when looking at these properties separately, e.g. there could there be non-lossy simple reductions from GOAL-POWER
E . We show that this is not the case. We proceed as for the authenticated encryption case. For privacy and integrity, in turn, we show that reductions from multi-key key recovery to single-key security are inherently lossy; the lower bound then follows by Lemma 12. We give the details in Appendix D.
Other Single-Key Security Notions. Given the results above concerning reductions from multi-key AE security notions to the single-key notions AE-PAS, IND-PAS and CTI-CPA, one can obtain analogous results for equivalent or weaker single key notions, such as where ciphertexts being indistinguishable from random strings (IND, AE) is replaced by (weaker) left-or-right indistinguishability (LRIND, LRAE). The idea is that if there were a tight reduction from an n-key game to single-key LRAE-PAS, say, then this reduction could be combined with the tight reduction from LRAE-PAS to AE-PAS to obtain a tight reduction from the n-key game to AE-PAS that contradicts Corollary 18. However, "tight" is defined here with respect to a number of parameters including, crucially, : the maximum advantage in the AE-PAS game. If is close to 1, then so is the "loss". In other words, the tightness lowerbounds that one can prove using our existing results for strictly weaker single-key security notions are only meaningful for schemes that are secure according to the stronger notions. This leaves open the possibility that tight multi-key to single-key reductions exist for schemes that achieve the weaker single-key security notions, but not the stronger ones. Moreover, our meta-reduction techniques cannot be directly applied to left-or-right indistinguishability, since the meta-reduction cannot correctly simulate left-or-right encryption queries during the rewinding phase without making its own (possibly prohibited) oracle queries (unlike for IND when the meta-reduction simply samples random strings of the appropriate length).
Public Key Encryption. It should be possible to adapt our existing techniques to the public key setting. Let LRIND-CPA be the standard game in which the adversary is given the public key and can query a left-or-right encryption oracle. Note that the honest encryption oracle is omitted as it is rendered superfluous by the public key. Since public key encryption is typically randomised rather than noncebased, repeated left-or-right encryption queries are not prohibited, so a meta-reduction M can use its own left-or-right challenge oracle to correctly simulate left-or-right queries from the reduction R during the rewinding phase, without M becoming an invalid adversary. However, if R can also make decryption queries, then simulating these queries during the rewinding phase might force M to be invalid (such as if one instance of R attempts to decrypt the output of the left-or-right encryption oracle sent to an earlier instance of R). In summary, it should be possible to show reductions from multi-key games to single-key LRIND-CPA are lossy for public key encryption schemes secure according to LRIND-CPA, but to show an analogous result for LRIND-CCA one needs to additionally assume that ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random strings (which is a rather strong assumption in the public key setting). We leave formally proving these claims for future work.
Conclusion
We have presented a general family of multi-key security definitions for authenticated encryption, where the adversary can adaptively corrupt keys. We have shown, for a very large class of authenticated encryption schemes, for most members of our family of definitions and for widely-accepted single-key security definitions, that any black-box reduction from the n-key security of an encryption scheme to its single-key security will incur a loss close to n.
For practitioners who set security parameters based on provable guarantees, this shows that security reductions have an inherent shortcoming. Since keys are sampled independently, the corruption of one key should not affect the security of another, yet it is impossible in many cases to prove that security does not degrade from the single-key setting to the n-key setting. It appears that the loss of n is an unfortunate, unavoidable artefact of the proof.
We have shown that the loss of reductions is inevitable for multi-key definitions where the adversary has access to an honest encryption oracle. We therefore left open the possibility that for security notions without such an oracle, tight reductions may be found. Furthermore, our impossibility results apply to schemes where ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random strings. It may be possible that tight reductions exist for schemes that achieve weaker forms of confidentiality, such as left-or-right indistinguishability. Historically, the community has tended to opt for stronger and stronger security notions, but perhaps a slightly weaker single-key notion would be preferred if it tightly implied a meaningful multi-key notion. Finally, it was pointed out by an anonymous reviewer that, in practice, the number of keys an adversary can corrupt is likely to be much smaller than the number of keys in use; it might be possible to find tighter multi-key to single-key reductions for multi-key games where the adversary can corrupt at most q c keys (with q c << n). We leave these interesting open questions for future work. 
A Valid Adversarial Behaviour for AE Games
Pointless and Prohibited Queries. Since encryption is deterministic, the response to certain oracle queries can be predicted in advance. Therefore the adversary learns nothing from these queries; we call them pointless. Without loss of generality we assume that valid adversaries do not make such queries.
The following queries are pointless:
-Repeat a query to any oracle other than Enc(the Enc oracle sometimes samples random ciphertexts, but all other oracles are deterministic). -Make a query D(i, C, N ), where C was the response to a query E(i, M, N ) (since the response will be M , by correctness). -Make a query E(i, M, N ), where M = ⊥ was the response to a query D(i, C, N ) (since the response will be C, by tidiness). Some other queries lead to hidden bits being trivial to recover (without having to corrupt a key); we call these queries prohibited, since valid adversaries are not permitted to make them. The following queries are prohibited:
-Repeat a query Enc(i, j, M, N ) (if the response to both queries is the same, then with very high probability b j = 0 and otherwise b j = 1). It is not necessary to prohibit queries being forwarded between the Enc and LR oracles, since we do not consider games where both these challenge oracles are present.
Correct Nonce Use. The parameter X ∈ {IV, NR, MR} determines how the adversary may use nonces in encryption queries. We say A uses nonces correctly with respect to X if the following statements hold: 
B Relations between Security Notions
Reducing Multi-Key Security to Single-Key Security. To show that our lower tightness bounds are optimal, in the sense that they match the upper bound provided by simple generic reductions from single-key security to n-key security with a loss linear in n, we consider the two natural formulations of multi-key security discussed at the beginning of Sect. 3.
The Multi-Bit Setting. We start with considering the variant of the multi-key game of Definition 7 where the adversary is restricted to challenge queries with i = j. This corresponds to the natural 'multi-bit' game, where there is one hidden bit b i for each key K i and the adversary wins the game if it can guess b i without corrupting K i .
Theorem 19. Let GOAL ∈ {AE, LRAE, IND, LRIND, CTI}, POWER ∈ {CCA, CPA, CDA, PAS}, n ≥ 1, X ∈ {IV, NR, MR} and let E be an AE scheme. Suppose A is a valid adversary in GOAL-POWER X,n E such that, for all queries to Enc(i, j, M, N ), LR(i, j, M 0 , M 1 , N ), and Dec(i, j, C, N ), it holds that i = j. Then we can construct a valid adversary B against GOAL-POWER X,1 E , running in approximately the same time as A, such that
Proof. The adversary B simulates the environment of A in the GOAL-POWER X,n E game. First, B chooses a random index i * ←$[n], and then, for each i ∈ [n \ i * ], B generates n − 1 keys K i ←$ KG and chooses n − 1 random bits b i ←${0, 1}. Implicitly, K i * is the secret key in the game played by B and b i * is the hidden bit in the game played by B. Formally, the simulation of the environment of A works as follows:
-If A makes the query Cor(i * ), then B outputs a random bit and terminates.
-If A makes an oracle query with i = i * , either to one of the challenge oracles Enc, Dec and LR, or to one of the honest oracles E and D, then B forwards this query to its own oracle in the GOAL-POWER X,1 E experiment and returns the response to A.
-If A makes an oracle query with i = i * , then B simulates the response to the query using its own K i and b i , exactly as in the GOAL-POWER X,n E game. -When A terminates and outputs a tuple (j, b ), if j = i * , then B outputs a random bit. Otherwise B outputs b .
Since all the queries made by B are also made by A and since A is a valid adversary, it follows that B uses nonces correctly with respect to X and makes no pointless or prohibited queries. Thus B is a valid adversary. Moreover, the running time of B essentially consists of the running time of A, plus a minor overhead to simulate the GOAL-POWER X,n E experiment once. The precise runtime depends on the queries made by A. It remains to show that
Let GUESS be the event that A returns a tuple (j, b ) in the real experiment GOAL-POWER X,n E (A) such that j = i * . Since i * is chosen by B uniformly at random from [n] and does not appear in the real experiment GOAL-POWER X,n E (A), we must have
Also, let SMART be the event that A does not corrupt the key K j corresponding to the bit b j it guesses in the real experiment GOAL-POWER X,n E (A). This event is so named because corrupting K j would not be 'smart' at all: for A to be valid and also exhibit this behaviour, A must make no challenge queries whatsoever for K j and b j and therefore its guess b is independent of b j , yielding 0 advantage. We remark that GUESS and SMART are independent, since i * is chosen uniformly from [n] regardless of the behaviour of A.
Given that SMART and GUESS both occur, the simulation by B of the environment of A is perfect:
-B is able to answer all of A's queries to Cor, since it knows the keys K i for i = i * and A does not make a query Cor(i * ). -When A makes a query of the form E(i, M, N ) or D(i, C, N ) with i = i * , B is able to respond correctly since it knows K i . -When A makes a query of the form E(i * , M, N ) or D(i * , C, N ), B is able to respond correctly using its own E and D oracles. -When A makes a query of the form Enc(i, j, M, N ), LR(i, j, M 0 , M 1 , N ), or Dec(i, j, C, N ), we have i = j and:
• either i = i * , in which case B responds correctly using its own K i and b i , • or i = i * , in which case B responds correctly using its own challenge oracles, with K i * and b i * being the secret key and the hidden bit, respectively, used by the challenge oracles in the game played by B.
Let W A be the event GOAL-POWER X,n E (A) = 1 and let W B be the event GOAL-POWER X,1 E (B) = 1. By the preceeding observation, we have
where the second equality holds since the choice of i * made by B is independent of the output of the real experiment GOAL-POWER X,n E (A). Furthermore,
This is because, given that ¬SMART occurs, A makes no challenge queries corresponding to the bit it tries to guess and B either returns a random bit or, if A tries to guess b i * , then B returns the bit returned by A, but will have made no challenge queries. It follows that
and hence
Similarly,
and Adv
Now, given that SMART occurs, if GUESS does not occur, then either A tries to corrupt K i * and B aborts the simulation -since A is 'smart', this means A would have guessed b j for some j = i * in the real experiment GOAL-POWER X,n E (A) -or B completes the simulation but A returns (j, b ) for some j = i * . In either case, B returns a random bit, so
as required.
The Single-Bit Setting. Since Theorem 19 covers only one of the two natural formulations of multi-key security discussed at the beginning of Sect. 3, it is natural to ask whether a similar result can be proven for the other natural variant: the single-bit setting, where j = 1 for all queries made by the adversary. Indeed, this is the case.
Theorem 20. Let GOAL ∈ {AE, LRAE, IND, LRIND, CTI}, POWER ∈ {CCA, CPA, CDA, PAS}, n ≥ 1, X ∈ {IV, NR, MR} and let E be an AE scheme. Suppose A is a valid adversary in GOAL-POWER X,n E such that, for all queries to Enc(i, j, M, N ), LR(i, j, M 0 , M 1 , N ), and Dec(i, j, C, N ), it holds that j = 1 and, at the end of the game, A returns the guess (1, b ). 4 Then we can construct a valid adversary B against GOAL-POWER X,1 E , running in approximately the same time as A, such that
Proof. This is essentially a standard hybrid argument. The adversary B computes as follows. First, B chooses random i * ←$[n] and generates n − 1 keys K i ←$ KG for i = i * . Implicitly, K i * and b 1 are the secret key and the hidden bit, respectively, in the game played by B.
For all 1 ≤ i < i * , if A makes a challenge query for K i , then B answers as if b = 0. For all i * < i ≤ n, if A makes a challenge query for K i , then B answers as if b = 1. For honest encryption and decryption queries under K i (i = i * ), B simulates the oracles honestly. If A makes challenge or honest queries under K i * , then B passes these to its own oracles. If A queries Cor(i) for i = i * , then B returns K i to A. If A queries Cor(i * ), then B aborts and outputs 0. Finally, when A returns (1, b ) , B returns b . To simplify notation, we write (b ← A) for the event that A returns (1, b ) .
We remark that B is valid: every oracle query from B corresponds to a query for the key K i * made by A and A is valid, so B makes no prohibited or pointless queries and uses nonces correctly with respect to X. Moreover, the runtime of B is essentially the same as A, plus the small overhead for simulating the experiment GOAL-POWER X,n E once. It remains to show that and A is a valid adversary, so if A corrupts K i , then A issues no challenge queries for K i and hence (1 ← A) has the same probability regardless of whether i−1 or i occurs. It follows that The General Case. One may wonder why we had to distinguish between the multi-bit and the single-bit settings in Theorems 19 and 20, instead of directly proving a result for the generalized security notion from Definition 7. One may be tempted to think that the latter should be possible, again with a linear loss n. We remark that this seems not to be the case; removing the assumptions on the adversary in Theorems 19 and 20 (that is, the restriction that A always chooses i = j, or j = 1, respectively) appears difficult. In the game played by the single-key adversary B, there is one secret key K and one hidden bit b; in the proof for the multi-bit case (Theorem 19) B chooses random i * ←$[n] and associates b i * and K i * with b and K, respectively, while in the proof for the single-bit case (Theorem 20) B chooses random i * ←$[n] and associates b 1 and K i * with b and K, respectively. In the general case, the multi-key adversary A can associate the same secret key with multiple bits and even corrupt this key as long as none of those bits are subsequently guessed; it is unclear how B can simulate this consistently with just one secret key K and one hidden bit b. To answer queries from A, B may have to 'combine' keys that it has generated with the hidden bit b it does not know, which does not seem possible using the oracles available to B.
Nevertheless, our main objective behind the introduction of the generalised multi-key security definition (Definition 7) was to capture both natural variants of multi-key security -the single-bit setting and the multi-bit setting -within a unified framework. Theorems 19 and 20 show that security with respect to both these natural notions is implied by security with respect to a corresponding single-key security notion, albeit with a loss of n, the number of keys.
Relations among Multi-Key Notions. In the single-key case, many security notions that at first appear different are, in fact, equivalent [5, 7] . We already mentioned the equivalence between left-or-right versus real-or-random challenge oracles. In a different dimension, some oracle access can become redundant, for instance LRIND-PAS and LRIND-CPA are equivalent: a valid adversary can use its challenge oracle LR to perfectly emulate access to a 'true' encryption oracle.
However, if the adversary plays a game with n > 1 keys and is allowed to adaptively corrupt some of these keys, achieving tight reductions between the various notions becomes considerably harder. For instance, the reduction used to show equivalence between LRIND-PAS and LRIND-CPA above no longer works for a valid LRIND-CPA adversary that made both a corrupt and a true encryption query to the same key: the reduction would not yield a valid LRIND-PAS adversary.
Nevertheless, we show in Theorem 21 that relations among the single-key security notions induce relations among the n-key security notions, but this approach results in an additional loss factor of n in any relation, compared to the single-key case. Therefore it remains an open problem to determine if any of the multi-key security notions are (tightly) equivalent.
The disappearance of known equivalences was previously observed by Bellare et al. [9] in the context of multi-instance security (here an adversary has to guess all the challenge bits). They argued why left-or-right security was the most 'robust' notion in their context. Rather than trying to determine the most robust notion in our context, we ensure that our negative results hold for almost all conceivable security notions covered by Definition 7. For instance, we treat both the real-or-random and left-or-right formulations of confidentiality, without having to worry how tighly they relate to oneanother in our multi-key setting. Thus we rule out bypassing our negative results simply by tweaking the multi-key security definition.
D Lower Bounds for Simple Reductions for Secrecy and Integrity Notions
In this section we provide lower bounds on simple reductions to single-key security notions for privacy. Informally, we show that for all C[E] is M -key-unique for some M ∈ M l then: if all reasonable adversaries have small IND-PAS loses approximately n. Notice that to show the lower bound for reductions from GOAL-POWER X ,n C[E] to CTI-CPA X,1 E , we have to assume E has both authenticity and secrecy. While this suffices for authenticated encryption schemes, it does not rule out non-lossy reductions for schemes that have authenticity but not secrecy. The technical reason for this additional assumption is that, to make sure that the meta-reduction M is a valid adversary against CTI-CPA X,1 E , i.e. does not attempt to decrypt a ciphertext that was output of the encryption oracle, M must suppress both the encryption and decryption queries made during the rewinding of the reduction R. For the case X = IV, it should be possible to argue that prohibited decryption queries are unlikely to occur, even if R can make encryption queries during the rewinding phase, as the nonces are chosen independently at random for each encryption query. We leave this for future work. In any case, if nonces are chosen (possibly deterministically) by R and M does not suppress the encryption queries made by R during the rewinding phase, then it is impossible to avoid M making prohibited queries.
